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The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, upholding the
validity of the California irrigation laws and sustaining the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of that State as announced in Tur-
lock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360; Central Irrig. Dist.v.
De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351; Board of Directors v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334,
and re Madera Irrig. Dist. Bonds, 92 Cal. 297, is of great inter-
est, involving as it does, the existence of these water companies
by which some four million acres of land have already been
reclaimed and rendered productive and whose bonds have been
purchased by innocent investors, whose security would be value-
less if the enactments of California and legislation of a similar
character in other States providing for the organization of such
corporations had been declared unconstitutional. In view of the
vast interests to be jeopardized by, an adverse holding the fair-
ness of the decision cannot be questioned, and we avoid comment
thereon. There are, however, some points in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Peckham to which we call attention.
This case arose upon an application for an injunction, brought
by one Maria Bradley in the United States Circuit Court to re-
strain the collector of the Fallbrook Irrigation District from exe-
cuting a deed conveying her land under a sale, made'pursuant
to the provisions of the irrigation law of California, known as
the "Wright Act." The grounds upon which the relief was
sought were that the act in question was in violation of the
Constitution of the United States and also of the Constitution of
the State of California. Upon the latter question the Supreme
Court agreed with the opinions rendered by the state court in
Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams; Central Irrig. Dist. v. De Lappe,
and cases referred to above. The real point in the decision was
that the act did not infringe upon that clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without "due
process of law," since the landowner has an opportunity to be
heard both as to whether his land would be benefitted by the
irrigation proposed and also upon the question of the valuation
and assessment of as much as might be included in the district.
The court held, moreover, that the use of water for the irriga-
YALE LA W JOURNAL.
tion of land in the manner provided could not be considered
otherwise than as a public use; nor is it material to this view
that in some cases the only effect might be to render more pro-
ductive lands already capable of cultivation. See Wurts v.
Hoagland, 114 U. S. 6o6; S2pencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 353;
Headv. Aynoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9; Hagar v. Reclamation
Dist. No. xo8, 111 U. S. 701; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S.
97, and California cases above referred to.
In concluding his opinion Mr. Justice Peckham said that the
imposition of an ad valorem tax upon the land to be benefitted in
a case of this nature, whether such tax might or might not be
contrary to the fundamental law of a State, violates no provision
of the Federal Constitution. The remedy for abuse in case the
burden rests unequally is to be pursued in the State courts, for,
in the language of Mr. Justice Field, in Mobile v. Kimball, the
Supreme Court of the United States "is not the harbor in which
the people of a city or county can find a refuge from ill-advised,
unequal and oppressive State legislation."
In Anglo-California Bank v. Secretary of Treasury, 76 Fed.
Rep. 742, the Circuit Court of Appeals discusses the effect of the
passage of a new tariff law upon goods imported and placed
under bond under a prior law. Certain steel rails had been so
treated, the warehouse entries beingliquidated under the tariff
law of March 3, 1883. They remained in the warehouse over
three years and became liable to be abandoned to the Govern-
ment under Rev. Stat., section 2971, which provides that goods
left in bond more than three years shall be regarded as aban-
doned to the Government and sold; the sale was, however, post-
poned several times by the Secretary of the Treasury at the
request of the importer, until finally the Wilson Bill was passed.
The importer then offered to withdraw the rails upon paying the
duties imposed by the latter act, but the court held that they
must pay the duties imposed by the act of 1883, affirming 71
Fed. 505. Its views were that since the act of July 28, 1866,
the word "abandonment," as used in section 2971, does not mean
an absolute abandonment, so as to vest the title in the Govern-
ment, but a vesting of absolute authority in the Government,
when goods have remained in the warehouse more than three
years, to sell them in order to pay the duties and charges thereon
and to pay the balance to the owner, or an authority to allow
the owner to withdraw the goods on such payment, and that as
no rule of the Secretary of the Treasury can annul or amend
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revenue laws the Government's right of sale was an accrued
right and within the saving clauses of the McKinley and Wil-
son Acts. It declined to follow Abbott v. U. S., 20 Ct. Cl. 280,
where the court held that where goods were imported and the
duties paid before the passage of the act of 1883, but not
removed from the warehouse until after the passage and more
than three years from the entry, the difference in the amount of
the duties should be refunded. In in re Schmid, 54 Fed. 145,
the goods had been in bond less than three years.
By the decision of the Circuit Court for the District of Con-
necticut in the case of in re Hirsch, 74 Fed. Rep. 928, the right
of an Internal Revenue Collector to refuse to produce in the
State courts, in a prosecution for the illegal sale of liquor, papers
or records which are not private in their nature, but are on file
in the Revenue Collector's office for the inspection of the public,
is denied. For this refusal Hirsch was sentenced for contempt
of court, whereupon he petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The justification offered by the petitioner for
this refusal was an alleged rule or regulation of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue "prohibiting the Collectors to pro-
duce in State courts any papers or documents relating to the
business of the taxpayer, upon prosecutions for violations of
State laws in regard to the sale of intoxicating liquor, against
those who have paid a special tax." Judge Shipman held that,
since the power to compel the production of this class of testi-
mony is the same in both State and Federal courts, it is ,not a
question of power generally, and this kind of evidence has no
special immunity peculiar to itself, since the returns are not
privileged, and the inconvenience caused the officers is part of
their duties. The petition was therefore dismissed.
